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Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based
growth model with nancial frictions. We nd that whether stronger patent protection
stimulates or sties innovation depends on credit constraints faced by R&D entrepreneurs.
When credit constraints are non-binding (binding), strengthening patent protection stimu-
lates (sties) R&D. The overall e¤ect of patent protection on innovation follows an inverted-U
pattern. An excessively high level of patent protection prevents a country from converging to
the world technology frontier. A higher level of nancial development inuences credit con-
straints through two channels: decreasing the interest-rate spread and increasing the default
cost. Through either channel, a higher level of nancial development stimulates innovation,
but the two channels of nancial development interact with the e¤ects of patent protection
di¤erently. Via the interest-spread (default-cost) channel, patent protection is more likely to
have a negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial development.
We test these results using cross-country regressions and nd that patent protection and
nancial development have a negative interaction e¤ect on innovation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we explore the e¤ects of patent protection in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based
growth model, in which a country invests in R&D to adopt technologies from the world technology
frontier and may gradually converge to the technology frontier. A novelty of our growth-theoretic
analysis of patent policy is that we consider nancial frictions in the form of potentially binding
credit constraints on R&D entrepreneurs. As in Aghion et al. (2005), due to moral hazard,
R&D entrepreneurs may not be able to borrow as much as they want for their R&D investment.
When these credit constraints are non-binding, we nd that strengthening patent protection by
increasing patent breadth leads to a larger amount of monopolistic prot, which stimulates R&D
and technological progress. This positive monopolistic-prot e¤ect captures the traditional view of
patent protection. However, when the credit constraints are binding, we nd that the monopolistic
distortion arising from patent protection leads to more severe nancial frictions, which stie R&D
and slow down technological progress. The intuition of this negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of
patent protection can be explained as follows. Strengthening patent protection causes more severe
monopolistic distortion, which in turn reduces aggregate income and tightens credit constraints
faced by R&D entrepreneurs. As a result, the rates of innovation and economic growth decrease.
This nding is consistent with recent studies that often nd the presence of negative e¤ects of
patent protection on innovation.1 Furthermore, we nd that the positive monopolistic-prot e¤ect
of patent protection prevails when the level of patent protection is below a threshold value, whereas
the negative nancial distortionary e¤ect of patent protection prevails when the level of patent
protection is above the threshold. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on R&D
and innovation follows an inverted-U pattern that is commonly found in empirical studies.2 An
excessively high level of patent protection even prevents a country from converging to the world
technology frontier. In this case, the countrys technology level relative to the world technology
frontier converges to zero in the long run.
We consider the case in which a higher level of nancial development inuences credit con-
straints through two channels: increasing the default cost as in Aghion et al. (2005) and decreasing
the interest-rate spread. Empirical studies, such as Lerner and Schoar (2005), Qian and Strahan
(2007) and Liberti and Mian (2010), often nd that nancial development reduces interest rates,
the contracting cost of nancing and the collateral spread of capital. We nd that by decreasing
the interest-rate spread or increasing the default cost, a higher level of nancial development stim-
ulates innovation. Intuitively, by decreasing the interest-rate spread, the interest rate becomes
lower, which in turn increases the present value of future monopolistic prots and the value of
inventions. By increasing the default cost, R&D entrepreneurs are less likely to default, and hence,
banks are more willing to lend to entrepreneurs for their R&D investment.
Interestingly, the two channels of nancial development interact with the e¤ects of patent
protection di¤erently. We nd that via the interest-spread (default-cost) channel, patent protection
is more likely to have a negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of nancial
development. The intuition of these results can be explained as follows. When the interest-
rate spread decreases, the present value of future prots and the value of inventions increase.
Consequently, entrepreneurs are incentivized to borrow more funding for R&D, rendering the
1See for example Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008).
2See for example Qian (2007) and Lerner (2009).
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credit constraints more likely to be binding in which case patent protection has a negative e¤ect
on innovation. When the default cost increases, banks become more willing to lend to R&D
entrepreneurs, rendering the credit constraints less likely to be binding in which case patent
protection has a positive e¤ect on innovation.
We test the above theoretical implications using cross-country regressions. We nd that patent
protection and nancial development have direct positive e¤ects on economic growth. This nding
is consistent with Ang (2010, 2011) who also empirically explore the e¤ects of both patent protec-
tion and nancial development on R&D activity. We complement the analysis in Ang (2010, 2011)
by considering the interaction e¤ect of patent protection and nancial development on economic
growth. In summary, we nd that patent protection and nancial development have a negative in-
teraction e¤ect on innovation, which is consistent with the interest-spread channel through which
patent protection is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a higher level of
nancial development. Therefore, to capture the complete e¤ects of patent policy on economic
growth, it is useful to take into consideration the interaction between patent protection and nan-
cial development.
This study relates to the literature on patent policy. In this literature, Nordhaus (1969)
provides the seminal study in which he shows that increasing patent length causes a positive e¤ect
on innovation and a negative static distortionary e¤ect on welfare. While Nordhaus (1969) focuses
on a partial-equilibrium framework, we consider a dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) model in
which the monopolistic distortion caused by patent protection interacts with nancial frictions to
a¤ect credit constraints and stie innovation. Subsequent studies in this literature, such as Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), explore patent breadth in addition to patent length.
Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review of this patent-design literature. Our study
instead explores the e¤ects of patent policy in a DGE model in which the nancial distortionary
e¤ect of patent policy arises through a general-equilibrium channel. Therefore, this study relates
more closely to the macroeconomic literature on patent policy and economic growth based on
DGE models.
The seminal DGE analysis of patent policy is Judd (1985), who nds that an innite patent
length maximizes innovation and eliminates the relative-price distortion because all industries
charge the same markup. Our model features an innite patent length under which the relative-
price distortion is absent as in Judd (1985). However, we show that patent breadth interacts with a
nancial distortion that a¤ects credit constraints and R&D. Subsequent studies in this literature
explore patent breadth as an alternative patent-policy instrument; see for example, Li (2001),
Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).3 Some of these studies also nd that
strengthening patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on innovation and growth. Our study
di¤ers from these previous studies by exploring the e¤ects of patent protection in the presence of
nancial frictions and in a distance-to-frontier R&D-based growth model that enables us to explore
the technology convergence of countries. Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2014) also analyze the e¤ects of
patent protection in a distance-to-frontier model and show that the innovation-maximizing level of
patent protection depends on the income level of a country. However, the abovementioned studies
3For other patent-policy instruments, see ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) and Kiedaisch (2015) on
patentability requirement, Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) on protection against imitation,
Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and Sener (2012) on rent protection activities, and Chu (2009),
Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012), Chu and Pan (2013) and Cozzi and Galli (2014) on blocking patents. These studies
neither consider nancial frictions nor the distance-to-frontier approach.
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neither feature nancial frictions nor consider the interaction between patent protection and credit
constraints, which are the novel contributions of this study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the theoretical results. Section 4 discusses the regression results. The nal section concludes.
2 An R&D-based growth model with credit frictions
In this section, we consider a distance-to-frontier R&D-based growth model with nancial frictions
based on the seminal work of Aghion et al. (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2006). We extend their
model by allowing for variable patent breadth, the value of inventions being dependent on multiple
periods of prots and an interest-rate spread that a¤ects the present value of future prots. We
consider a discrete-time model and use the model to explore the interaction e¤ects of patent
protection and credit constraints on the technology convergence of countries.
2.1 Households and workers/entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of countries, indexed by a superscript i, that are behind the world technology
frontier.4 For simplicity, we follow previous studies to assume that countries do not exchange goods
or factors but are subject to international technology spillovers from the frontier. There is a unit
continuum of innitely-lived households in each country. These households own intangible capital
(in the form of patents that generate monopolistic prots) and consume nal goods (numeraire).
The lifetime utility function of the representative household in country i is given by
U i =
1P
t=0
Cit
(1 + )t
,
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and Cit is consumption of the represen-
tative household in country i at time t. The asset-accumulation equation is Ait+1 = (1+r
i
t)A
i
t Cit .
From standard dynamic optimization, the linear utility function implies that in equilibrium the
real interest rate is equal to the discount rate, such that rit = .
In addition to the innitely-lived households in the economy, we follow previous studies to
assume the presence of overlapping generations of workers/entrepreneurs in each period to create
a need for the entrepreneurs to borrow funding for R&D. At the beginning of each period t, L
workers enter the economy, and they work to earn wage W it . At the end of the period, each
worker becomes an entrepreneur and devotes part of her wage income iW it to R&D, where
i 2 (0; 1).5 At the beginning of the next period, those entrepreneurs who have succeeded in
their R&D projects sell their inventions to households and use the proceeds for consumption.
Without loss of generality, we normalize L to unity. A worker who enters the economy in period
t has the utility function uit = y
i
t + Et[o
i
t+1]=(1 + ), where y
i
t denotes consumption when young
and Et[oit+1] denotes expected consumption when old. If the amount of her R&D spending Z
i
t is
4In this study, we do not model the behavior of the technology frontier and simply take it as given.
5Here we assume that the entrepreneur may not be able to devote her entire wage income to R&D. Our results
also hold when i = 1.
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less than iW it , then a worker/entrepreneur simply consumes W
i
t   Zit in period t or saves part
of it subject to the market interest rate rit. However, if Z
i
t > 
iW it , then the worker/entrepreneur
would need to apply for a loan subject to credit constraints, which will be described in details in
Section 2.7.
2.2 Final goods
The nal goods sector is perfectly competitive. Firms in this sector employ workers and a con-
tinuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods v 2 [0; N it ] to produce nal goods using the following
production function:
Y it = (L
i
t)
1 
Z N it
0
[xit (v)]
dv, (1)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1    in production. Lit is labor
input. xit (v) is the amount of intermediate goods v 2 [0; N it ], and N it is the number of available
intermediate goods in country i at time t. Competitive rms take the prices of nal goods and
factor inputs as given to maximize prot. The conditional labor demand function is given by
W it = (1   )Y it =Lit, where Lit = L = 1 from the market-clearing condition. The conditional
demand function for intermediate goods is given by
xit (v) =


pit (v)
1=(1 )
, (2)
where pit (v) is the price of intermediate goods v in country i.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Each di¤erentiated intermediate good v is produced by a rm that owns the patent of the product
and has market power, which is determined by the level of patent protection to be explained below.
In industry v, the rm produces xit (v) units of intermediate goods using x
i
t (v) units of nal goods
as inputs. Therefore, the prot function of the rm in industry v is
it (v) = p
i
t (v)x
i
t (v)  xit (v) =

pit (v)  1
  
pit (v)
1=(1 )
, (3)
where the second equality follows from (2). Using (3), one can derive the prot-maximizing price
pit (v) given by 1=. To capture the e¤ects of patent protection, we follow Goh and Olivier (2002)
to model patent breadth i 2 (1; 1=) as a policy variable.6 In this case,
pit (v) = 
i. (4)
6The idea is that the unit cost for other rms to produce an identical product is i, which is increasing in the
level of patent protection. Therefore, stronger patent protection allows the producer who owns the patent to charge
a higher markup; see also Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) for a similar formulation. This formulation
captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price.
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Combining (3) and (4), we obtain the amount of prot as a function of patent breadth given by
it (v) =
 
i   1 
i
1=(1 )
 (i), (5)
which is increasing in i for i  1=.
2.4 Aggregate production function
Substituting (2) and (4) into (1) yields
Y it =


i
=(1 )
N it . (6)
Equation (6) shows that the growth rate of Y it is determined by the growth rate of N
i
t and that the
level of Y it is decreasing in patent breadth 
i, which captures the e¤ect of markup distortion on
the level of output. In other words, by increasing the price of intermediate goods, a larger markup
leads to less intermediate goods being produced and also less nal goods being produced.7 In the
presence of credit constraints, patent protection would then generate a negative e¤ect on R&D as
a result of this markup distortion as we will show later.
2.5 R&D and the value of patents
In each country, there is an R&D sector. In each period t, workers/entrepreneurs devote nal
goods to R&D at the end of the period to invent new intermediate goods that will be produced in
the next period. To ensure balanced growth, we assume that each entrepreneur spreads her R&D
spending Zit over N
i
t R&D projects.
8 Therefore, the amount of nal goods that an entrepreneur
devotes to each of her R&D projects is Zit=N
i
t , and the probability of her R&D projects being
successful is P it = minfZit=(N itit); 1g,9 where 1=it captures the productivity of R&D in country i.
We follow Acemoglu (2009, chapter 18) to assume that it is an increasing function in N
i
t=Nt,
where Nt is the level of technology at the world technology frontier. Nt grows at a constant rate
g > 0, which is taken as given by other countries. Lets dene country is relative technology level
to the frontier as it  N it=Nt 2 (0; 1), which is an inverse measure of the countrys distance to the
world technology frontier. We adopt the following specication for it:
it = [(
i
t)
 + ]

Zit
N it

, (7)
7If we follow Romer (1990) to assume that intermediate goods are produced from capital, instead of nal
goods, this markup distortion would still exist because the presence of markup and prots lowers capital income
and reduces capital accumulation. However, allowing for capital accumulation would complicate the transition
dynamics substantially.
8To ensure the innovation probability P it  1 in the presence of growth in Zit , we only need to assume that
entrepreneurs spread their R&D spending Zit over &N
i
t R&D projects, where & > 0. Without loss of generality, we
set & = 1.
9For simplicity, we assume that an entrepreneurs R&D projects either all succeed or all fail.
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where the parameters f; g > 0 and f; g 2 (0; 1) are common across countries. This speci-
cation features the catching-up e¤ect under which a less developed country that has a smaller
it is able to grow faster by absorbing more world technologies. The term (Z
i
t=N
i
t )
 captures an
intratemporal duplication externality of R&D as in Jones and Williams (2000). Given the unit
continuum of R&D entrepreneurs and the independence of R&D projects (across entrepreneurs),
the law of large numbers applies, so that the accumulation of inventions at the aggregate level
follows a deterministic process given by
N it  N it+1  N it =
Zit
it
=
N it
(it)
 + 

Zit
N it
1 
, (8)
where Zit=
i
t = N
i
tZ
i
t=(N
i
t
i
t) is the number of successful R&D projects in period t.
Each R&D project has a probability P it to give rise to a new variety of intermediate goods.
When a new variety is successfully invented at the end of period t, production of the intermediate
goods begins in period t + 1. We denote the value of an invention created in period t as V it (v).
Here we assume that the discount rate for future prots is given by ri + i = + i, where i  0
denotes an exogenous interest-rate spread in country i. For example, Lerner and Schoar (2005),
Qian and Strahan (2007) and Liberti and Mian (2010) nd that nancial development reduces
interest rates, the contracting cost of nancing and the collateral spread of capital. Here we use
i to capture these nancial frictions in a simple way.
Under the assumption above, V it (v) can be expressed as
V it (v) =
1P
s=t
is+1 (v)
(1 + ri + i)s+1 t
=

 
i

+ i
, (9)
which is increasing in patent breadth i and decreasing in i. The positive e¤ect of i captures the
positive e¤ect of patent protection on the value of inventions. In a country that is more nancially
developed, there are less nancial frictions, which in turn reduce the interest-rate spread i and
increase the value of inventions. Finally, we make the following parameter restriction, which
guarantees that P it 2 (0; 1) and it 2 (0; 1).
Assumption 1 (g)1=(1 ) < 
 
i

=(+ i) < minf1=(1 ); [g( + )]1=(1 )g.10
2.6 Equilibrium without credit constraints
In this section, we explore the equilibrium level of R&D in the absence of credit constraints. The
zero-expected-prot condition of R&D is given by P itV
i
t = Z
i
t=N
i
t , which can be expressed as
V it = 
i
t ,
(i)
+ i
= [(it)
 + ]

Zit
N it

. (10)
10The assumption 
 
i

=(+ i) < 1=(1 ) ensures P it < 1 for 
i
t 2 (0; 1). Derivations available upon request.
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Therefore, the level of R&D in any period t is given by
Zit =

(i)=(+ i)
(it)
 + 
1=
N it , (11)
which is increasing in i for a given level of relative technology it. The growth rate of technology
is given by
git 
N it
N it
=
1
(it)
 + 

Zit
N it
1 
=
1
[(it)
 + ]1=

(i)
+ i
(1 )=
, (12)
which is also increasing in patent breadth i, for a given it, capturing the positive monopolistic
prot e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Furthermore, a higher level of nancial develop-
ment in the form of a decrease in the interest-rate spread i increases the growth rate of technology.
We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the absence of credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a higher
growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development in the form of a decrease in the
interest-rate spread also leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Proven in text.
In the long run, it converges to a steady state, in which N
i
t grows at the same rate as Nt.
11
Setting git to the world technology growth rate g in (12) yields the steady-state level of relative
technology it given by
i =
1
1=
(
1
g

(i)
+ i
(1 )
  
)1=
 1(i
+
; i
 
), (13)
which is increasing in the level of patent breadth i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i.
Note that Assumption 1 ensures 1 2 (0; 1) in the steady-state equilibrium. The balanced-growth
level of R&D is given by
Zit = (
i)
g
+ i
N it , (14)
which is increasing in patent breadth i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i. In other
words, a decrease in the interest-rate spread i causes the entrepreneurs to want to do more R&D.
11We show the stability of this steady state in Section 2.8.
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2.7 Equilibrium with credit constraints
Before the end of a period, each entrepreneur devotes her wage income iW it to N
i
t R&D projects
without borrowing. If the R&D spending Zit exceeds her wage income 
iW it , then she would have
to borrow Dit = Z
i
t iW it from a bank to nance her R&D projects. If her R&D projects succeed,
she repays the loan plus an interest payment equal to (1 + Rit+1)D
i
t at the end of the period. If
her R&D projects fail, she becomes bankrupt and repays nothing to the bank. Therefore, if the
entrepreneur truthfully reveals the outcome of her R&D projects, the expected payment received
by the bank is P it (1 + R
i
t+1)D
i
t + (1   P it )0. When banks make zero expected prot, we have
P it (1 +R
i
t+1)D
i
t = D
i
t, which implies P
i
t (1 +R
i
t+1) = 1.
What makes it di¢ cult to borrow is that an entrepreneur may want to default even when her
projects are successful. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to assume that banks do not observe
the outcome of R&D projects, and hence, the problem of moral hazard arises. Specically, by
paying a default cost hiZit where h
i 2 (0; 1), an entrepreneur can hide the outcome of her projects
and avoid repaying the loan. The cost parameter hi is an indicator of banks e¤ectiveness in
securing repayment and partly measures the level of nancial development in the country. In case
an entrepreneur decides to default, the entrepreneur must incur the default cost before observing
the outcome of her R&D projects. Therefore, entrepreneurs would not default if and only if the
following incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint holds:
hiZit  P it (1 +Rit+1)Dit = Dit, (15)
where Dit = Z
i
t   iW it = Zit   i(1  )Y it . Substituting this condition into (15) yields
Zit 
i(1  )Y it
1  hi =
i(1  )
1  hi


i
=(1 )
N it , (16)
where the last equality uses (6). We refer to this IC constraint as a credit constraint, which
becomes tighter as patent breadth i increases capturing an interaction between the monopolistic
distortion of patent protection and the nancial distortion of the credit constraint. The intuition
can be explained as follows. When patent breadth i increases, aggregate income Y it decreases
due to the markup distortion. As a result, a larger i reduces the income of entrepreneurs and
their ability to borrow. This e¤ect exists so long as entrepreneursability to borrow is a¤ected by
their income and in turn entrepreneursincome is related to aggregate income.
For convenience, we dene f i  i(1  )=(1  hi) 2 (0;1) as a composite parameter that is
increasing in the default cost hi. Equations (14) and (16) show that the balanced-growth level of
R&D spending Zit satises
Zit = min
(

 
i
 g
+ i
; f i


i
=(1 ))
N it . (17)
There exists a unique value of patent breadth i below (above) which the credit constraint does
not bind (is binding) in the long run. This threshold value of i is given by12
1(f
i
+
; i
+
)  g
g   (+ i)f i , (18)
12To ensure that the threshold value 1 < 1=, we assume f
i < (1   )g=( + i), which is equivalent to
hi < 1  (+ i)=(g).
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which is increasing in the countrys default cost f i and the interest-rate spread i. The intuition of
these two results can be explained as follows. First, a larger default cost f i reduces entrepreneurs
incentives to default and enables them to borrow more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit
constraint is less likely to be binding, which in turn increases the threshold value of patent breadth.
Second, a lower interest-rate spread i increases entrepreneursincentives to invest in R&D. As
a result, the credit constraint becomes more likely to be binding, which in turn decreases the
threshold value of patent breadth. In this case, a higher level of nancial development has di¤erent
implications on the threshold value of patent breadth depending on whether nancial development
is reected by an increase in the default cost or a decrease in the interest-rate spread.
Finally, whenever the credit constraint is binding, the growth rate of technology in country i
is given by
git =
N it
N it
=
1
(it)
 + 
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 
, (19)
which is decreasing in the level of patent breadth i, for a given it, capturing the nancial
distortionary e¤ect of patent protection on innovation. Furthermore, a higher level of nancial
development in the form of an increase in the default cost f i increases the growth rate of technology.
We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In the presence of binding credit constraints, stronger patent protection leads to a
lower growth rate of technology. A higher level of nancial development in the form of an increase
in the default cost leads to a higher growth rate of technology.
Proof. Proven in text.
2.8 Convergence
Using the denition of relative technology level it, we can derive its law of motion given by
it+1
it
=
N it+1
N it
=
Nt+1
Nt
, it+1 =

1 + git
1 + g

it. (20)
In the absence of credit constraints, we use (12) to express the law of motion for it as
it+1 =
it
1 + g
(
1 +
1
[(it)
 + ]1=

(i)
+ i
(1 )=)
 H i1(it). (21)
Even if the credit constraint does not bind in the long run, it may be binding in the short run
when it is small. When the credit constraint is binding, we can use (19) to express the law of
motion for it as
it+1 =
it
1 + g
8<:1 + 1(it) + 
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=;  H i2(it). (22)
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Combining (21) and (22) implies that country is technology level relative to the frontier evolves
according to the following law of motion:
it+1 = minfH i1(it); H i2(it)g,
from which we derive a threshold value ^i of relative technology level below (above) whichH i2 < H
i
1
(H i1 < H
i
2). In other words, when relative technology level 
i
t is below this threshold ^
i, it+1 evolves
according to H i2(
i
t) that is subject to the credit constraint. In contrast, when relative technology
level it is above the threshold ^
i, it+1 evolves according to H
i
1(
i
t) that is free from the credit
constraint. The threshold value ^i is given by
^i(i
+
; f i
 
; i
 
) 
(
1

"
(i)
(f i) (+ i)

i

=(1 )
  
#)1=
, (23)
which is increasing in patent breadth i but decreasing in the default cost f i and in the interest-
rate spread i. Intuitively, at a higher level of patent protection, the credit constraint is more
likely to be binding, which in turn expands the range of it within which 
i
t+1 evolves according
to H i2(
i
t) that is subject to the credit constraint. In contrast, when either the default cost or the
interest-rate premium increases, the credit constraint becomes less likely to be binding, which in
turn shrinks the range of it within which 
i
t+1 evolves according to H
i
2(
i
t).
In the following lemmata, we derive some properties of the functions fH i1 (it) ; H i2 (it)g, which
will be useful in determining the value of it at the steady state.
Lemma 1 H i1 (
i
t) is increasing and concave w.r.t. 
i
t, and satises the following properties:
H i1 (0) = 0, H
i
1 (1) < 1,
@H i1
@it
jit=0 > 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 H i2 (
i
t) is increasing and concave w.r.t. 
i
t, and satises the following properties:
H i2 (0) = 0,
@H i2
@it
jit=0 =
1
1 + g
8<:1 + 1
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=; .
Proof. See Appendix A.
In addition to the rst threshold value 1 of patent breadth dened in (18), we also dene a
second threshold value 2 of patent breadth below (above) which
@Hi2
@it
jit=0 > 1 (
@Hi2
@it
jit=0 < 1).
2(f
i
+
)  
"
f i 
g
1=(1 )
#(1 )=
, (24)
which is increasing in the default cost f i. We now consider three possibilities.
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Case 1 When i  1(f i; i), we have ^i  1(i; i).
In this case, although the credit constraint may be binding in the short run depending on the
initial value of i0, the credit constraint does not bind in the long run. Therefore, the steady-state
value of relative technology it is given by 
i = 1(
i; i), which is increasing in patent breadth
i as shown in (13). The long-run growth rate of technology in this country is g. Figure 1 shows
that the steady state is stable.
1tm +
0 mˆ ( )1m b tm
1t tm m+ =
( )2 tH m
( )1 tH m
Figure 1: Convergence under i  1
Case 2 When 1(f i; i) < 
i < 2(f
i),13 we have ^i > 1(
i) and @H
i
2
@it
jit=0 > 1.
In this case, the credit constraint is binding even in the long run. The steady-state value of
relative technology level it is determined by the xed point 
i = H i2 (
i), which yields
i =
8<:1
241
g
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 
  
359=;
1=
 2(i  ; f
i
+
), (25)
which is decreasing in patent breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i. The long-run growth
rate of technology in this country is g. Figure 2 shows that the steady state is stable.
13To ensure 1 < 2, we assume  < f
i[g   (+ i)f i](1 )=(1 )=g(1 )=(1 ).
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1tm +
0 ( )1m b( )2m b mˆ tm
1t tm m+ =
( )2 tH m
( )1 tH m
Figure 2: Convergence under 1 < 
i < 2
Case 3 When i  2(f i), we have ^i > 1(i) and @H
i
2
@it
jit=0  1.
In this case, it converges to 0 as shown in Figure 3, and
lim
t!1
it+1
it
= lim
it!0
H i2 (
i
t)
it
=
1
1 + g
8<:1 + 1
"
f i


i
=(1 )#1 9=;  i(i  ; f i+ )  1. (26)
Therefore, the balanced growth rate in country i in this case is
gi = lim
t!1

(1 + g)
it+1
it
  1

= (1 + g) i   1  g, (27)
where i is decreasing in patent breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i.
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1tm +
0 ( )1m b tm
1t tm m+ =
( )1 tH m
( )2 tH m
Figure 3: Divergence under i  2
3 Patent breadth and credit constraints
Based on the results in the previous section, we can divide countries into three groups. Without
loss of generality, we rearrange the order of the countries and denote the three groups as group 1,
2 and 3. For countries in group 1, their R&D activities are not restricted by the credit constraint,
and their technologies grow at the same rate as the world technology frontier in the long run.
The levels of patent protection in these countries satisfy i  1(f i; i), which is increasing in the
default cost f i and the interest-rate spread i. For countries in group 2, their R&D activities are
restricted by the credit constraint, but these countries can still keep pace with the growth rate of
the world technology frontier in the long run. The levels of patent protection in these countries
satisfy 1(f
i; i) < i < 2(f
i), where 2(f
i) is increasing in the default cost f i but independent
of the interest-rate spread i. For countries in group 3, their R&D activities are strongly restricted
by the credit constraint. In this case, the technology growth rate in these countries is slower than
that of the world technology frontier in the long run. The levels of patent protection in these
countries satisfy i  2(f i). According to this classication, the relative technology level i of a
country in the steady state is given by
i =
8>>><>>>:
1(
i
+
; i
 
); if i  1(f i
+
; i
+
)
2(
i
 
; f i
+
); if 1(f
i
+
; i
+
) < i < 2(f
i
+
)
0; if i  2(f i
+
)
, (28)
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and the balanced growth rate of technology is given by
gi =
8>>><>>>:
g; if i  1(f i
+
; i
+
)
g; if 1(f
i
+
; i
+
) < i < 2(f
i
+
)
(1 + g) i(i
 
; f i
+
)  1  g; if i  2(f i
+
)
. (29)
We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 There are three types of balanced growth paths in the world. First, when i 
1(f
i; i), relative technology level i converges to 1, and the growth rate of technology converges
to g. In this case, 1 is increasing in patent breadth 
i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread
i. Second, when 1(f
i; i) < i < 2(f
i), relative technology level i converges to 2, and the
growth rate of technology converges to g. In this case, 2 is decreasing in patent breadth 
i and
increasing in the default cost f i. Third, when i  2(f i), relative technology level i converges
to zero, and the growth rate of technology converges to (1 + g) i  1, which is decreasing in patent
breadth i and increasing in the default cost f i.
Proof. Proven in text.
Figure 4
Figure 4 illustrates the three groups of countries. Countries in group 1 are not nancially
constrained due to a high default cost f i. In this case, stronger patent protection increases the
amount of monopolistic prot, which in turn stimulates R&D and increases the relative technology
level 1 in the long run. A higher level of nancial development in the form of a lower interest-rate
spread i increases the value of inventions and the relative technology level 1 in the long run.
Countries in group 2 are nancially constrained due to a moderate default cost f i. In this case,
stronger patent protection amplies monopolistic distortion and reduces the level of output, which
in turn tightens the credit constraint on R&D and decreases the relative technology level 2 in the
long run. A higher level of nancial development in the form of a higher default cost f i enables the
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entrepreneurs to borrow more funding for R&D, which in turn increases the relative technology
level 2 in the long run.
For a given value of the default cost f i, an increase in the level of patent protection may cause
a country in group 1 to fall into group 2. Therefore, there exists a technology-maximizing level of
patent protection 1. This technology-maximizing level of patent protection 1 is a¤ected by the
level of nancial development. First, it is increasing in the default cost f i. As mentioned before, a
larger default cost f i reduces entrepreneursincentives to default, which enables them to borrow
more funding for R&D. In this case, the credit constraint is less likely to be binding, which in
turn increases the threshold value 1 of patent breadth. Second, the technology-maximizing level
of patent protection 1 is increasing in the interest-rate spread 
i. Intuitively, a higher interest
rate decreases the value of inventions and reduces entrepreneursincentives to invest in R&D. As
a result, the credit constraint becomes less likely to bind, rendering patent protection to be more
likely to have a positive e¤ect on R&D. A higher level of nancial development increases the cost
of default but decreases the interest-rate spread in a country. Therefore, under a higher level
of nancial development, it is not clear whether patent protection would become more likely to
have a positive or negative e¤ect on innovation. This depends on whether nancial development
increases the default cost or decreases the interest-rate spread. We summarize all the above results
in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Financial development has a positive e¤ect on innovation whereas patent protec-
tion has an inverted-U e¤ect on innovation. If nancial development increases the default cost,
then patent protection would be more likely to have a positive e¤ect on innovation under a higher
level of nancial development. If nancial development decreases the interest-rate spread, then
patent protection would be more likely to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a higher level
of nancial development.
Proof. Proven in text.
Finally, countries in group 3 have a very low default cost f i. Given that R&D entrepreneurs
have strong incentives to default in this case, they are not able to borrow much funding for R&D.
In this case, the steady-state growth rate is given by (1 + g) i   1  g, where i is decreasing in
the level of patent breadth. An increase in the default cost helps to mitigate this problem and
raises the steady-state growth rate.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we examine the empirical evidence of our theoretical predictions. The implications
of our theory that will be tested are the followings:
1. The likelihood that a country converges to the frontier growth rate increases with its level
of nancial development but decreases with its level of patent protection.
2. In a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, nancial development has a positive
e¤ect on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
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3. In a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, patent protection has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP relative to the frontier.
4. Under a higher level of nancial development, patent protection can be more likely to have
a negative or positive e¤ect on the steady-state level of relative per-capita GDP.
4.1 Data
The dataset consists of 98 countries from 1980 to 2009 featuring variables of economic growth,
patent protection, nancial development and other controls.14 We transform the dataset into a
cross section by taking annual average of each variable for each country. The growth rate of a
country is taken to be the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 1980 and 2009.
For the measure of patent protection within a country, we consider the commonly used index of
patent rights developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008).15 The data for nancial
development is based on the Financial Development and Structure Dataset from Cihak et al.
(2012).
Following King and Levine (1993) and Beck et al. (2010), we take advantage of three indicators
of nancial intermediation that can proxy the overall development of a countrys nancial system.
The rst measure is the private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as
a ratio to GDP, denoted as private credit. The second indicator is deposit money banksassets
as a ratio to GDP, denoted as bank assets. The third indicator is liquid liabilities as a ratio to
GDP, denoted as liquid liabilities. We use private credit as our preferred measure of nancial
development as in Ang (2010, 2011) and consider the other two measures as robustness checks
because as stated in Levine et al. (2000), private credit excludes credit granted to the public sector
and credit granted by the central bank and development banks.
In our theoretical model, the amount of borrowing as a ratio to output is given by
Dit
Y it
=
Zit   iW it
Y it
= min
(

 
i
 g
+ i

i

=(1 )
; f i
)
  i(1  ),
where the second equality follows from (17) and (6). Therefore, Dit=Y
i
t is increasing in the default
cost f i and decreasing in the interest-rate spread i. In other words, an increase in Dit=Y
i
t in the
data may reect the e¤ect of a larger f i or the e¤ect of a smaller i.
4.2 Convergence regression
We rst use the convergence regression model based on Aghion et al. (2005) to test our theoretical
implications. The starting point of this model is that each country is assumed to be on a transition
14See Appendix B for description and sources of data.
15The index covers ve dimensions: 1) extent of coverage; 2) membership in international patent agreements;
3) provisions for loss of protection; 4) enforcement mechanisms; and 5) duration of protection. Each dimension is
assigned a value between zero and one. The overall index is the unweighted sum of these ve values, with a larger
value reecting a higher level of patent protection.
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path towards its steady state. From (20)-(22), patent protection and nancial development a¤ect
the relative growth rate of a country that is converging to the frontier given by (1 + git)=(1 +
g) = it+1=
i
t. In particular, (21) and (22) show that the initial relative technology level has a
negative e¤ect on the transitional relative growth rate and that nancial development always has
a positive e¤ect regardless of whether it increases the default cost f i or decreases the interest-rate
spread i. In countries without binding credit constraints, patent protection positively a¤ects
the transitional relative growth rate, whereas in countries with binding credit constraints, patent
protection negatively a¤ects the transitional relative growth rate. This empirical analysis is an
extension of Aghion et al. (2005) with the addition of patent protection, so we follow them to
approximate our theoretical model by the following cross-sectional regression, which can be used
to investigate the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development on the steady-state level
of per-capita GDP growth relative to the frontier:
gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i, (30)
where gi denotes the average annual growth rate of per-capita GDP, i denotes the average level
of patent protection, Fi denotes the average level of nancial development, yi is the log of initial
per-capita GDP, xi is a set of other control variables and "i is the disturbance term with mean
zero. The subscript i denotes country, and country 1 is the technology leader, which we take to
be the United States.
Dene country is initial relative per-capita GDP as y^i  yi   y1. Then we can rewrite (30) as
gi   g1 = i  (y^i   y^i ) ,
where the steady-state value y^i is given by setting the right-hand side of (30) to zero (i.e., when
the growth rate di¤erence is zero):
y^i =
0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + xxi + "i
 (y + y  i + Fy  Fi)
. (31)
In (30), i is a country-specic convergence parameter given by
i = y + y  i + Fy  Fi. (32)
It is useful to note that a country converges to the technology frontier if and only if the growth
rate of its relative per-capita GDP depends negatively on the initial y^i; that is, if and only if
i < 0. Thus, from implication 1 we know that the likelihood of convergence would increase with
nancial development and decrease with patent protection if and only if
Fy < 0 and y > 0. (33)
From (31), the long-run e¤ects of nancial development and patent protection on the relative
output of a country that converges are as follows:
@y^i
@Fi
=   1
i|{z}
+
(F + Fi + Fyy^

i )| {z }
?
, (34)
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and
@y^i
@i
=   1
i|{z}
+
( + FFi + yy^

i )| {z }
?
. (35)
4.3 Relative-technology-level regression
In addition to the convergence regression, we also consider the following relative-technology-level
regression:
yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i, (36)
where yi is the average log of per-capita GDP, i is another disturbance term with mean zero, and
the other variables are dened in the same way as in the convergence regression. This regression
model also captures the implications from (21) and (22) that patent protection and nancial
development a¤ect a countrys relative technology level with respect to the technology frontier. It
is useful to note that our data sample covers 30 years, so we try to approximate the steady-state
level of relative per-capita GDP by yi y1, and hence, this regression model is used as an additional
test of implications 2-4.
4.4 Regression results
Considering the endogeneity of nancial development as discussed in Aghion et al. (2005) and
also the endogeneity of patent protection, we estimate the regression models using instrumental
variables. We use legal origins as the instrument for nancial development Fi. As for the instru-
ments for patent protection i, we combine two sets of instruments. The rst set of instruments is
chosen according to Gould and Gruben (1996), including initial relative output yi  y1 and initial
degree of openness. We do not use the other instruments in their paper to avoid overidentication.
The second set of instruments is a simulated instrumental variable (SIV). For country i, we use
the average degree of patent protection of all the other countries (except country i) in 1980 as an
instrument for country is average patent protection over 1980-2009. We refer to this instrument
as simulated patent protection and denote it as siv_ipri. This variable is to control for the en-
dogenous response of patent protection to changes in innovation activities within a country, and
we assume that the changes are not correlated across countries.16 The interacted terms between
instruments are also used as instruments for the interacted terms of the endogenous variables.
Tables I and III report the estimation results from the generalized method of moments (GMM),
and Tables II and IV report the results from two-stage least squares (2SLS). We consider both
GMM and 2SLS for robustness.
16For a discussion of SIV, see for example Currie and Jonathan (1996) and Mahoney (2015). We use SIV to
deal with the issue of weak instruments. We nd that if we only use initial relative GDP and initial openness as
instruments for patent protection, the two variables su¤er from the problem of weak instruments. Moreover, we
tried using lagged patent protection, which is the degree of patent protection within each country (from 1960 to
1979) before our sample period. All these regressions results are available upon request.
19
[Insert Tables I and II here]
From Tables I and II, we nd that the following results are robust and signicant for most of
the regressions: (1) y > 0, Fy < 0, y < 0; and (2)  > 0, F > 0, F < 0. The rst set of
results fy > 0, Fy < 0, y < 0g supports implication 1. It is useful to recall that a country
converges to the technology frontier if and only if i = y + y  i + Fy  Fi < 0. Therefore,
Fy < 0 and y > 0 imply that the likelihood of convergence increases with nancial development
but decreases with patent protection.
To understand the implications of the second set of results f > 0, F > 0, F < 0g, lets
being by assuming that all countries lag behind the United States in the steady state; i.e., y^i < 0.
Financial development would have a positive long-run e¤ect on the relative income of each country
that converges if and only if F + Fi + Fyy^

i > 0. In this term, Fi is negative because the
estimated F is negative, whereas Fyy^

i is positive because the estimated Fy is negative. The
result F > 0 implies that nancial development is likely to have a positive long-run e¤ect, and
this positive e¤ect is unlikely to vanish or become negative because F +Fyy^

i > 0. This nding is
consistent with implication 2. We also consider the magnitude of the coe¢ cients. From regression
1 of Table II, we have F + Fi = 0:0750  0:0210 i. Given a mean of 2.568 for i, F + Fi
is positive for the average country. Together with Fyy^

i > 0, nancial development has a positive
long-run e¤ect on the relative income of the average country. Moreover, we use equation (34) to
compute the long-run e¤ect of nancial development and nd that nancial development has a
positive long-run e¤ect in the vast majority of countries.
As for patent protection, it would have a positive long-run e¤ect on each country that converges
if and only if  + FFi + yy^

i > 0. In this term, FFi is negative because the estimated F
is negative, and yy^

i is also negative because the estimated y is positive. The result  > 0
implies that patent protection may have a positive long-run e¤ect, but this positive e¤ect may
turn negative because FFi + yy^

i < 0. From regression 1 of Table II, we have  + FFi =
0:0204   0:0210  Fi. Given a mean of 0.448 for Fi, the average country has  + FFi > 0.
However, given that yy^

i < 0 and that Fi can be as large as 1.776, patent protection would have
a negative long-run e¤ect in countries with su¢ ciently large Fi. In other words, patent protection
has a negative (positive) long-run e¤ect when the level of nancial development Fi is high (low).
Using equation (35) to compute the long-run e¤ect of patent protection, we nd that patent
protection has a positive (negative) long-run e¤ect in about one-third (two-thirds) of countries,
and these countries have a low (high) level of nancial development. This nding is consistent
with implications 3 and 4 as well as the scenario in which the interest-spread channel dominates
in inuencing credit constraints. In other words, when the level of nancial development is low
(i.e., a high interest-rate spread in the model), patent protection has a positive long-run e¤ect.
When the level of nancial development is high (i.e., a low interest-rate spread in the model), the
e¤ect of patent protection becomes negative.
[Insert Tables III and IV here]
From Tables III and IV, we nd that  > 0, F > 0, F < 0 and y > 0. The implications of
this set of results are similar to the above, so we do not repeat the discussion and simply report
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the results as a robustness check. Finally, we also estimate the likelihood of convergence for each
country. We use the coe¢ cients in regression 1 of Table II to compute the estimated value of
convergence parameter i, and its standard deviation. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) to classify a
country as most likely to converge in growth if its estimated i is at least two standard deviations
below zero, as most likely to diverge in growth if its estimated i is at least two standard deviations
above zero, and as uncertain to converge otherwise. As reported in Table V, we nd that none of
the countries in our sample is classied as most likely to diverge, and there are 54 countries (out
of 103) that are classied as most likely to converge.
[Insert Table V here]
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of patent protection and nancial development on
economic growth. The novelty of our analysis is that we consider the presence of credit constraints
on R&D entrepreneurs. We nd that whether strengthening patent protection has a positive or
negative e¤ect on technological progress depends on credit constraints. When credit constraints
are not binding, strengthening patent protection has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. When
credit constraints are binding, strengthening patent protection has a negative e¤ect on growth.
An increase in the level of patent protection may cause the credit constraints to become binding.
As a result, the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U
pattern. A higher level of nancial development inuences credit constraints via two channels:
decreasing the interest-rate spread and increasing the default cost. These two channels have
di¤erent implications on the e¤ects of patent protection. Our regression analysis nds evidence
that strengthening patent protection is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on innovation under a
higher level of nancial development, which is consistent with the interest-spread channel. These
results show the importance of an often neglected interaction between the monopolistic distortion
caused by patent protection and the nancial distortion caused by credit constraints.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. From (21), we see that H i1 (0) = 0. Simple di¤erentiations yield
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Proof of Lemma 2. From (22), we see that H i2 (0) = 0. Simple di¤erentiations yield
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Appendix B: Description of the dataset
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset for 103 countries over 1980-2009. Variables
used for regression are listed below with denitions and data sources. The variables of annual
change rate (i.e., economic growth rate and ination rate) are calculated through log di¤erences.
In the cross-section regressions, the annual variables are all averaged over the sample period.
 gi: the averaged annual growth rate of real per capita GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 yi: the log of real per capita GDP at the initial period (1980). Source: Penn World Table
7.1.
 yi: the average log of real per capita GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 i: the average degree of patent protection over 1980-2009, measured by the average index
of patent rights. Source: Park (2008).
 siv_ipri: the average degree of simulated patent protection, measured by the average index
of patent rights of all countries except country i in 1980. Source: Park (2008).
 Fi: the average level of nancial development. There are three measures: 1) the average
value of private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of
GDP (private credit); 2) the average value of deposit money banksassets as a share of GDP
(bank assets); 3) the average value of liquid liabilities as a share of GDP (liquid liabilities).
Source: Cihak et al. (2012).
 seci: the average years of secondary schooling in the population over 15 in the initial period
(1980). Source: Barro and Lee (2013).
 inf i: the average ination rate over 1980-2009, dened as log di¤erence of GDP deator.
Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 gov i: the average government expenditure as a share of GDP over 1980-2009. Source: Penn
World Table 7.1.
 openi: the average openness to trade over 1980-2009, dened as sum of real exports and
imports as a share of GDP. Source: Penn World Table 7.1.
 legal i: Dummy variables for British, French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist legal ori-
gins. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
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Summary statistics
Variable # of obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
i 103 2.568 0.907 0.5 4.721
Fi (private credit) 103 0.448 0.388 0.013 1.776
Fi (bank assets) 103 0.502 0.396 0.016 1.981
Fi (liquid liabilities) 103 0.511 0.395 0.063 2.721
gi 103 0.014 0.017 -0.037 0.084
yi 103 8.309 1.256 6.006 10.371
yi 103 8.458 1.346 5.816 10.804
oldi 103 1.897 0.009 1.872 1.917
seci 103 1.409 1.073 0.06 5.19
inf i 103 0.030 0.003 0.017 0.038
gov i 103 0.099 0.052 0.035 0.325
openi 103 0.686 0.435 0.186 2.926
Legal origin classications
 British: Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, United Kingdom, Ghana,
Guyana, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Sir Lanka, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Singapore, Sierra Leone, Swaziland,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania, Uganda, United States, South Africa, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
 French: Argentina, Burundi, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic,
Cote dIvoire, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, In-
donesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, Mali, Malta, Mozambique,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Paraguay, Rwanda, Senegal, El Salvador, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zaire.
 German: Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Korea.
 Scandinavian: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.
 Socialist: Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Vietnam.
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Appendix C: Regression results
Table I: Convergence regression: GMM
Regression equation: gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.0188*** 0.0166*** 0.0200*** 0.0174*** 0.0127*** 0.0182***
(8.40) (5.52) (7.98) (4.46) (4.69) (3.70)
F 0.0672*** 0.0592*** 0.0808*** 0.0715*** 0.0454* 0.0929**
(4.58) (2.75) (6.11) (2.99) (1.89) (2.34)
F -0.0190*** -0.0176*** -0.0214*** -0.0191*** -0.0125** -0.0238**
(-5.67) (-3.45) (-6.74) (-3.31) (-2.09) (-2.40)
y -0.0156*** -0.0127*** -0.0137*** -0.0107** -0.00376 -0.00769*
(-5.89) (-3.69) (-4.34) (-2.55) (-1.24) (-1.87)
y 0.00750*** 0.00628*** 0.00594*** 0.00490*** 0.00388*** 0.00432***
(6.09) (4.60) (4.64) (3.28) (2.86) (2.78)
Fy -0.0242*** -0.0237*** -0.0191*** -0.0200*** -0.0215*** -0.0150***
(-7.32) (-6.76) (-7.97) (-5.88) (-6.96) (-3.07)
Hansens J -test (p-value) 0.6001 0.5504 0.5465 0.3622 0.6198 0.5562
GMM C-test (p-value) 0.0323 0.2441 0.0659 0.5543 0.0611 0.1350
Adj. R2 0.231 0.263 0.266 0.268 0.275 0.164
F-test 52.38 257.4 460.0 823.0 821.4 1188.7
Sample size 103 103 103 103 103 103
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. On the instruments
for i, we use simulated patent protection (siv_ipr), initial relative output (yi   y1) and initial degree
of openness. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf, open. Hansens J -test
stands for the test of overidentication of instruments, GMM C-test stands for testing the endogeneity
of instrumented variables (orthogonality conditions). All regressions are estimated by GMM estimator.
We use the command ivregress gmmin Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table II: Convergence regression: 2SLS
Regression equation: gi   g1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1)
+y  i  (yi   y1) + Fy  Fi  (yi   y1) + xxi + "i.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.0204*** 0.0192*** 0.0197*** 0.0181*** 0.0132*** 0.0159**
(3.65) (3.02) (4.09) (2.66) (3.02) (2.40)
F 0.0750** 0.0736* 0.0752** 0.0687 0.0371 0.0682
(2.24) (1.78) (2.14) (1.51) (1.16) (1.36)
F -0.0210** -0.0211** -0.0201** -0.0184* -0.0102 -0.0176
(-2.49) (-2.06) (-2.38) (-1.68) (-1.26) (-1.39)
y -0.0150** -0.0136** -0.0125** -0.0105 -0.00490 -0.00584
(-2.42) (-2.13) (-2.23) (-1.65) (-1.01) (-1.08)
y 0.00699** 0.00640** 0.00568** 0.00519** 0.00431** 0.00426*
(2.61) (2.42) (2.55) (2.09) (2.11) (1.82)
Fy -0.0234*** -0.0221*** -0.0203*** -0.0195*** -0.0225*** -0.0186***
(-3.88) (-3.45) (-3.58) (-3.10) (-4.34) (-3.10)
2-test for oid (p-value) 0.6407 0.5504 0.5465 0.3622 0.6198 0.5562
F-test for endog (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
Adj. R2 0.233 0.254 0.276 0.294 0.289 0.216
F-test 17.75 13.70 22.49 11.86 27.09 17.57
Sample size 103 103 103 103 103 103
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. On the instruments for
i, we use simulated patent protection (siv_ipr), initial relative output (yi   y1) and initial degree of
openness. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf, open. The term oidstands
for overidentication of instruments, endogrepresents the endogeneity of instrumented variables. All
regressions are estimated by 2SLS estimator. We use the command ivregress 2sls in Stata to perform
the regressions.
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Table III: Relative-technology-level regression: GMM
Regression equation: yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.305*** 0.330*** 0.311*** 0.372*** 0.264*** 0.311***
(11.85) (7.78) (9.64) (9.42) (6.29) (4.46)
F 2.754*** 3.140*** 2.383*** 2.896*** 1.625*** 2.326***
(10.92) (13.26) (7.32) (10.79) (4.19) (4.47)
F -0.635*** -0.748*** -0.550*** -0.687*** -0.400*** -0.578***
(-10.21) (-11.72) (-7.10) (-10.07) (-3.96) (-4.30)
y 0.870*** 0.898*** 0.888*** 0.896*** 0.951*** 0.958***
(69.84) (30.16) (45.15) (32.17) (101.65) (46.23)
Hansens J -test (p-value) 0.4519 0.6317 0.3174 0.4820 0.2627 0.4212
GMM C-test (p-value) 0.0227 0.1451 0.1177 0.2253 0.2015 0.2316
Adj. R2 0.959 0.953 0.965 0.959 0.965 0.959
F-test 5243.7 1122.0 2193.5 982.3 3403.5 952.3
Sample size 103 103 103 103 103 103
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. On the instruments
for i, we use simulated patent protection (siv_ipr), initial relative output (yi   y1) and initial degree
of openness. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf, open. Hansens J -test
stands for the test of overidentication of instruments, GMM C-test stands for testing the endogeneity
of instrumented variables (orthogonality conditions). All regressions are estimated by GMM estimator.
We use the command ivregress gmmin Stata to perform the regressions.
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Table IV: Relative-technology-level regression: 2SLS
Regression equation: yi   y1 = 0 + i + FFi + Fi  Fi + y  (yi   y1) + xxi + i.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Private credit Bank assets Liquid liabilities
Control regressors Empty Full Empty Full Empty Full
Coe¢ cient estimates
 0.293*** 0.306*** 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.281*** 0.314***
(4.64) (4.47) (5.00) (4.86) (3.25) (3.70)
F 2.591*** 2.797*** 2.510*** 2.678*** 1.729*** 2.309***
(5.74) (5.13) (5.79) (5.73) (3.36) (3.73)
F -0.600*** -0.678*** -0.589*** -0.639*** -0.427*** -0.577***
(-5.07) (-4.64) (-5.34) (-5.35) (-3.09) (-3.59)
y 0.889*** 0.889*** 0.884*** 0.891*** 0.946*** 0.938***
(30.66) (25.54) (29.74) (25.80) (28.05) (27.67)
2-test for oid (p-value) 0.4900 0.6450 0.3561 0.5504 0.3336 0.4245
F-test for endog (p-value) 0.0010 0.0036 0.0008 0.0008 0.0522 0.0151
Adj. R2 0.961 0.959 0.964 0.962 0.964 0.960
F-test 880.0 457.1 1125.7 571.0 902.9 507.2
Sample size 103 103 103 103 103 103
Note: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In parentheses are t-statistics based on robust
standard errors with small sample. We use legal origins as the instrument for Fi. On the instruments for
i, we use simulated patent protection (siv_ipr), initial relative output (yi   y1) and initial degree of
openness. In column (2), (4) and (6) we add control regressors sec, gov, inf, open. The term oidstands
for overidentication of instruments, endogrepresents the endogeneity of instrumented variables. All
regressions are estimated by 2SLS estimator. We use the command ivregress 2sls in Stata to perform
the regressions.
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Table V: Convergence club membership
1 2
Countries most likely to converge Countries uncertain to converge
Cyprus Ireland Mali United States Mexico
Japan Nicaragua Peru Germany Philippines
Thailand Guatemala Togo Austria Rwanda
Switzerland New Zealand Ecuador Netherlands Botswana
Malaysia India Sweden Central African Republic
China Pakistan France Algeria
Jordan Bangladesh Israel Congo Republic
Malta Honduras Australia Sudan
Guyana Iran Korea Italy
Luxembourg Morocco Norway Iraq
Iceland Brazil Zambia Tanzania
Singapore Paraguay Malawi Argentina
Portugal Costa Rica Zimbabwe Ghana
Papua New Guinea Bolivia Burundi Jamaica
United Kingdom Trinidad and Tobago Benin Sri Lanka*
Tunisia Nepal Niger Uganda
Panama Cote dIvoire Cameroon Haiti
Mozambique Uruguay Greece El Salvador
South Africa Swaziland Syria Belgium
Indonesia Dominican Republic Zaire Sierra Leone
Canada Venezuela Denmark Poland
Mauritius Senegal Finland Bulgaria
Egypt Colombia Liberia Hungary
Spain Kenya Gabon Romania
Vietnam Mauritania Turkey
Note: The estimated convergence parameters are based on the coe¢ cients in regression 1 of Table
II. The estimated convergence parameter increases within each group, as you move down each list and
then to the right. There are three groups of classication: countries most likely to converge, countries
uncertain to converge, and countries most likely to diverge in growth rate. A country is classied to the
rst group if its estimated convergence parameter is at least two standard deviation below zero, to the
third group if its estimated convergence parameter is at least two standard deviation above zero, and to
the second group otherwise. However, there is no country that belongs to the third group according to
our estimates.
* The estimated convergence parameter is negative (indicating convergence) in countries before Sri
Lanka and positive (indicating divergence) in countries after (and including) Sri Lanka.
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